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Tyke02

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  1. Tyke02

    Tp-Link

    If what you have is an AV600 powerline extender it doesn't make a wifi connection with the router, but connects via house wiring. For that to happen there needs to be a second item plugged in to mains near the router, and connected to the router by a network cable. If so, when the router was changed it might be that either the network cable wasn't connected to the new router, or the plug in adapter isn't powered up, or it needs to be reset . Pictures of what to look for to check this out here: https://www.tp-link.com/uk/home-networking/powerline/tl-wpa4220-kit/
  2. I wasn't aware of that. However in the UK a sequence of studies were done by a collaboration of DHSC/ONS/GAD/HO at various points through the pandemic on direct and indirect impacts of covid including: "A. Health impacts from contracting COVID-19 (A) B. Health outcomes for COVID-19 worsened because of lack of NHS critical care capacity (B) C. Health impacts from changes to health and social care made in order to respond to COVID19, such as changes to emergency care (C1), changes to adult social care (C2), changes to elective care (C3) and changes to primary and community care (C4). D. Health impacts from factors affecting the wider population, both from social distancing measures (D1) and the economic impacts increasing deprivation (D2)." (D) The summary of their findings in the 15 July 2020 report was: "These comparisons show several interesting points: • The direct COVID-19 deaths account for the majority of all excess deaths • However, when morbidity is taken into account, the estimates for the health impacts from a lockdown and lockdown induced recession are greater in terms of QALYs than the direct COVID-19 deaths. • Much of the health impact, particularly in terms of morbidity, will be felt long after the pandemic is assumed to last (1 year for this exercise, though this is a scenario not a forecast). It should be noted that the health impacts modelled here represent a scenario with mitigations in place. Without mitigations, a far larger number of people would have died from COVID-19 such that the QALY impact from COVID-19 deaths would be more than three times the total QALY impact of all the categories (mortality and morbidity impacts) for the CSS mitigated scenario presented here. A comparison with an unmitigated scenario is provided in Annex G and shows that mitigations have prevented up to 1.5m direct COVID-19 deaths." https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dhsconsgadho-direct-and-indirect-impacts-of-covid-19-on-excess-deaths-and-morbidity-15-july-2020
  3. I think it is worth noting that in addition to not containing Justin's "quote", the reference provided lacks context that is provided in the original source document that it is describing. Drawing conclusions from such reporting alone, rather than going back to the primary source that is being reported on, can be misleading. In addition to the much promoted half million deaths figure, the same piece of modelling looked at what might happen with a variety of policy interventions (e.g. case isolation, home quarantine of contacts, voluntary social distancing of over 70s, social distancing of all etc). The published model gave (in addition to the higher figure) a range of other figures for deaths over the first three months that varied between around 9,000 and 98,000 deaths depending upon the mix and timing of policy interventions. Surprising that this still needs to be pointed out again nearly four years on, but here we are. It is now clear from evidence given to the public inquiry that in the end UK decisions on policy in March 2020 were taken not as a direct result of this modelling, but due to rapidly rising hospitalisations leading to the potential for imminent collapse of the NHS.
  4. This is not an answer to what I was asking. Care homes contain a lot of the people who GB would have wished to have under targeted shielding. What was done in the UK was insufficient to do that, and would have been more inefficient if there was higher covid prevalence in society outside. It has been suggested that some of the care home outbreaks were carried in by staff. To prevent that you would need staff to shield along with their residents. Similarly any household with elderly or vulnerable people in it would all need to be shielding together, so no school for the kids and no work for the adults (unless they can do their work remotely). Do you really think that's in any way feasible? If so, how would you make it work? If you like you could do a comparison between the costs of your alternative approach and compare them with the figures you have already quoted for actual spending . Of course you would first have to specify the practical measures needed to support that large number of households/care homes subject to targeted shielding so that you can cost what it would take to support them. Then add on the items from what was actually done that would still have had to be spent. If you did that well then you would have some figures to support your opinions, but until then you just have arm waving generalisations. Misleading. I replied to some of your posts prior to the one you linked pointing out some of the issues with what you were suggesting. You just did your usual thing of repeating your assertions without addressing what I raised. I think by the time you posted this I was sufficiently bored with your intransigence to ignore you for a while...
  5. If you are so keen to know the answer why not find out for yourself? Whatever answer you find I can't see it contradicting my observation that in multigenerational households, or those with clinically vulnerable members, the household would need to shield together. The numbers involved and consequent logistical challenges should be obvious, and yet the "targeted protection" crowd are silent on how they could be tackled. The question is what resources and logistics would have been needed to make it work, and as I said before how a poorly implemented focused protection approach would have compared to what the UK govt chose to do. As I've said there were many problems in UK planning and preparedness, as well as decision making. There is evidence about how much treatment methods improved later that I've described, but I've seen no numerical evidence about how much healthcare access affected individuals' chances in the early stages. All you have is that you heard something on the radio, sometimes you remember a number and sometimes you don't, but you can't cite any reference, or give enough information for anyone to go find whatever it was this unknown person was basing their comments on. Given your history of misunderstanding things, and selective quotation, I regard what you have to say on this point as hearsay. No, pointing out where your arguments and evidence base are insufficient to support your assertions. I note that when you dismiss some of the things I describe you don't seem able to point to what the issues that you see are in the same way. I can only suggest that if you want a different response you could improve on those points. Since you don't seem to have understood my POV accurately, based on the questions you ask, it seems that this is just another of your attempts at deflection.
  6. As far as I can see I've been mentioning it now and again in posts on here since August 2022. It's quite straightforward, the similar countries that you mention tended to be working to similar playbooks to the UK. None had much choice because they hadn't put in place the infrastructure in advance to do anything else. I am pointing out that a subset of countries who took a different approach had much better outcomes in health, their economies, and civil liberties. This was in response to "If you do that then you have the same problem as with care homes, where to stop covid getting in you would also have to have the staff shielding so that they didn't bring it in." Did you read to the end of the sentence? You seem to be pointing to evidence that your idea of focused protection couldn't ever work. Still no evidence then. That's fine, everyone's allowed an opinion.
  7. Yeah, that was another assertion that you couldn't make stand up under close examination, but you seem to have forgotten that again. Funny that you wouldn't accept a similar suggestion that we couldn't automatically assume that every other country would have the same experience with Omicron because they had different variants and vaccines beforehand. As I mentioned, if you want to know what works it's worth looking at countries who did well. We probably have a lot less to learn from countries with similar results to ours.
  8. On the contrary I have repeatedly said that there needs to be a trade off between costs and benefits (health/economic damage/freedom and so on). In the beginning I focused on reading a wide range of opinions from people with all sorts of views and looked at the arguments they were making and what evidence they offered. It seemed to me that there was a good deal of uncertainty in the early days so I didn't have a preconceived idea about where that balance should be, but as it wasn't my decision to make that didn't seem to matter much. Unfortunately that leader doesn't seem particularly accurate. For example they have heard from the prominent lockdown sceptic Carl Heneghan a while back, and some of the more establishment figures giving evidence are showing some open mindedness: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/16/uk-lockdowns-were-a-policy-failure-health-expert-tells-covid-inquiry What's emerging from the inquiry is that the UK had a poorly planned and haphazard implementation, and some other countries did much better. Ironically they did this with a set of policies that drastically reduced the number who died while having less impact on the economy and on civil liberties, and no lockdowns. Very few if any public health policies will have no impact on civil liberties, the question is how to reduce this impact as far as possible by eliminating the most damaging interventions. The comparison you need to make is whether a failed attempt at targeted shielding would have led to a better or worse result than what the UK government did. The inquiry heard that Boris met with Heneghan and Sunetra Gupta alongside some of his other advisors but was not convinced by them. Anders Tegnell the architect of the Swedish approach was also there and reportedly did not recommend trying it in the UK. As I said, therapies improved after the first wave, but that doesn't imply that early treatment was completely ineffective, unless there is some evidence available that shows it. What is of greater interest is the IFR rising again in the second wave suggesting that rationing of healthcare resources may have led to worse patient outcomes.
  9. You have a very short memory, only a few days ago I was outlining the approaches used by a number of Asian countries that meant they didn't need to lock down, and suggested that it was worth learning from them.
  10. If that's what you think then please feel free to point out specifically where the logic of my arguments or the evidence base supporting them is flawed. There's nothing wrong with the data, but I'd question what you've inferred from it. The elephant in the room with the idea of targeted shielding is in the practicalities. For example, what would families (especially multigenerational ones) do if one of them is clinically vulnerable or elderly? The options would seem to be they all shield together or you segregate the vulnerable in some government provided facility. If you do that then you have the same problem as with care homes, where to stop covid getting in you would also have to have the staff shielding so that they didn't bring it in. Even those living alone still need to access food and, and while family and friends can help with some of that for many, there will be some who don't have that support. In a time when all food delivery slots were booked up a couple of weeks in advance so unavailable. Sure the supermarkets would offer a special time for the vulnerable to go in, but if my local one is anything to go by it will also contain a lot of staff outside of that group. This is in contrast with the situation where everyone is trying to reduce the spread of infections - in that case those younger staff are still there but less likely to be infected and to pass it on. This group is also one that requires a disproportionate amount of healthcare, so are we going to segregate a subset of healthcare workers and have them shield too? Given the numbers of people involved it's hard to see how the logistics could have been made to work, and that's not even considering the various social and economic impacts that you like to talk about of locking millions away with even less freedom than was allowed during the general UK lockdowns, and for long enough for vaccines to be created and distributed. If you have any real world examples that demonstrate how these practicalities were addressed maybe you could share them? Another false inference I'm afraid.
  11. I have no memory of you providing any such evidence. Anecdote, hearsay and opinion maybe. I'd forgotten this part of your playbook, complaining that your interlocutor is doing the same thing as you. I'm asking about the second wave, and what you attribute the increase in IFR during that period to No, I'm pointing to some uncomfortable facts about those actually admitted to ghospital during the second wave. Ah yes, that's what I mean by anecdote and hearsay, and not really relevant at all to the second wave. And I am still talking about those admitted to hospital, not specifically those who were cared for in ICU. If you actually read that Lancet link you will see comment on how much of thee required treatment (e.g. provision of oxygen) in a general ward. So I was referring to periods of peak demand for Covid, and you think your opinions about what happened in Summer 2020 are somehow relevant to that? That's either a swerve, or you haven't taken the trouble to either read or understand my postings. I think what some people regard as a major problem was not so much what he said in the heat of the moment, but repeatedly denying it afterwards, lying to the House of Commons about it.
  12. Well you've repeatedly asserted that, but no evidence has been provided. However this is just a reflex denial without evidence diversion to allow you to change the subject. What did you think was causing the increase in IFR that coincided closely with the second wave? Quite a few of those involved seem to believe that at busy times rationing affected the quality of care: "COVID-19 has highlighted an NHS with insufficient resources and not enough capacity or healthcare resilience to keep society running during a pandemic. The pressures on NHS capacity prior to the pandemic and the inadequate expansion in healthcare provision since, likely mean the UK will struggle to achieve international standards (even those of a low-resource setting), at least not in a reasonable timeframe. Without the essential access to healthcare we lose the opportunity to prevent disease progression and with it the opportunities to save lives, prevent disability, and to more effectively safeguard the NHS. Necessity has spawned potentially useful innovations. Dedicated COVID assessment centres, remote assessments, virtual wards, and remote monitoring are likely to achieve clinical care closer to pre-pandemic standards of care while saving hospital admissions and clinical time. However, the lack of real-world funding and therefore contractural obligation to deliver such services, together with the most crucial of healthcare gaps - the lack of clinical triage, clinical follow-up, and a safe level of inpatient capacity - severely curtail the benefit these innovations can achieve." https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanepe/article/PIIS2666-7762(21)00178-2/fulltext ....and another swerve to avoid addressing the points I was raising about variations in IFR during busy periods.
  13. As it happens, Eddie Lister (Johnson's ex chief of staff) also confirmed that he had heard Johnson say this while he was testifying under oath at the Covid inquiry.
  14. It would be a bit surprising if those who chose to earn higher level scientific qualifications, and went on to careers in research or professional practice didn't start with at least a slightly wider understanding of this sort of thing, wouldn't it? Interesting. What you see as disparaging is from my perspective pointing out where either your evidence base or your logic aren't giving you the the proof that you think they are. It is entirely open to you to ignore me, or engage with it and explain why what I've said doesn't negate your points. You seldom seem able to do the latter, and end up being sarcastic or petulant and go quiet for a bit before simply repeating your initial post again. That's what makes it look as though you haven't understood the points that I made. By the way, I think it is pretty clear from the inquiry that there were some big problems in UK government preparedness and decision making that led to a less effective response here than we could have had. That's why I think it is worth looking at what was done in those countries who had a much better time (short or no lockdown, less economic damage, lower impacts on freedom) to see what we might adopt in future.
  15. This would be true if nothing else could affect the IFR, that's what I meant by you ignoring other variables. More people being infected at the same time demonstrably put a greater load on healthcare, as described by an anonymous consultant here: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/nov/03/covid-inquiry-leaders-petty-preoccupations-fury-secret-consultant "What really struck me was what seemed to be a throwaway comment by Simon Stevens, the head of NHS England at the start of the pandemic. While discussing Matt Hancock taking decisions over who should live or die if hospitals were to become overwhelmed, Lord Stevens mentioned that “fortunately this horrible dilemma never crystallised”. I don’t know whether he really believes that hospitals were not overwhelmed. We may not have been inundated to the point of complete collapse. Maybe we were able to keep up the appearance of safety. But do not be mistaken: we were forced to take decisions that will have affected who lived and who died. Even now, the denial continues that this happened. It did. Our resources were so short that we were forced to choose which patients we were able to treat in all sorts of ways. We rationed oxygen, intensive care beds, non-invasive ventilation, even Covid tests early on. We did this with eyes open, in the full knowledge that we were treating patients differently to how we would if we had our usual resources available. If that isn’t rationing of healthcare, making choices for patients based on what we had available, then I would like to know what is. We tried to make ourselves believe at the time that this was justifiable clinically. Lower oxygen levels were still safe, we said. Shuttling critically ill patients between hospitals on portable ventilators wouldn’t be too risky. Patients would be safe to go back to their care homes, and we needed the beds, so that was all right too." Analyses are available of changes in the IFR through the pandemic. During the second wave it rose back to more than one, and according to one study might have been as high at 1.35 at the peak. After the peak it fell back to the same levels as before. Both the quote above, and those analyses, are consistent with more people dying as a result of healthcare resource shortages because more people were infected at the same time. It's another fairly pointless question when what drove the government policy decisions was effects on hospital capacity, so that resource constraints weren't adversely affecting people who could be saved. By Feb 2022 the UK IFR was down to around 0.07%, and people hospitalised primarily for Covid were using up around 10% of beds. Unfortunately that pushed occupation above the 85% regarded as required for safe operation to 95% and caused all sorts of problems like long waits for ambulances for urgent conditions like stroke, long wait times in queueing ambulances or A&E, overcrowding that probably led to poorer outcomes across all those needing healthcare.
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